• Corpus ID: 43855626

Studying Reciprocation Under Exploding Offers with Ultimatum Deadline Games 2 . 1

  title={Studying Reciprocation Under Exploding Offers with Ultimatum Deadline Games 2 . 1},
  author={Nelson Lau and Yakov Bart and J. Neil Bearden and Ilia Tsetlin},

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