Strong password-only authenticated key exchange

  title={Strong password-only authenticated key exchange},
  author={David P. Jablon},
  journal={Comput. Commun. Rev.},
  • David P. Jablon
  • Published 1 October 1996
  • Computer Science, Mathematics
  • Comput. Commun. Rev.
A new simple password exponential key exchange method (SPEKE) is described. It belongs to an exclusive class of methods which provide authentication and key establishment over an insecure channel using only a small password, without risk of offline dictionary attack. SPEKE and the closely-related Diffie-Hellman Encrypted Key Exchange (DH-EKE) are examined in light of both known and new attacks, along with sufficient preventive constraints. Although SPEKE and DH-EKE are similar, the constraints… 

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