Strong equilibrium in network congestion games: increasing versus decreasing costs

@article{Holzman2015StrongEI,
  title={Strong equilibrium in network congestion games: increasing versus decreasing costs},
  author={Ron Holzman and Dov Monderer},
  journal={Int. J. Game Theory},
  year={2015},
  volume={44},
  pages={647-666}
}
A network congestion game is played on a directed, two-terminal network. Every player chooses a route from his origin to his destination. The cost of a route is the sum of the costs of the arcs on it. The arc cost is a function of the number of players who use it. Rosenthal proved that such a game always has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Here we pursue a systematic study of the classes of networks for which a strong equilibrium is guaranteed to exist, under two opposite monotonicity… CONTINUE READING

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