Strong and Wrong

  title={Strong and Wrong},
  author={Andrew Schotter},
  journal={Journal of Theoretical Politics},
  pages={498 - 511}
  • A. Schotter
  • Published 1 October 2006
  • Psychology
  • Journal of Theoretical Politics
The main purpose of rational choice theory is to lay out in clear and transparent terms what conditions are necessary and/or sufficient for the validity of statements about consistent human behavior. Strong criteria for rationality are ‘wrong’ if understood as a positive description. However, their very strength provides a sharp guide for experimental social science’s project of mapping the properties of individual behavior. 

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