Strong Managers and Passive Institutional Investors in the UK

  title={Strong Managers and Passive Institutional Investors in the UK},
  author={Marc Goergen and Luc Renneboog},
  journal={Corporate Finance and Organizations eJournal},
  • M. GoergenL. Renneboog
  • Published 6 October 1998
  • Business, Economics
  • Corporate Finance and Organizations eJournal
The first striking feature is that ownership of the average UK company is diffuse: a coalition of at least eight shareholders is required to reach an absolute majority of voting rights. Even though the average firm has a dispersed ownership, the reader should bear in mind that there are about ten per cent of firms where the founder or his heirs are holding more than 30 per cent. The ownership structure is also shaped by regulation; the mandatory takeover threshold of 30%, for example, has an… 

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