Strength of the Social Dilemma in a Public Goods Experiment: An Exploration of the Error Hypothesis

@article{Willinger2001StrengthOT,
  title={Strength of the Social Dilemma in a Public Goods Experiment: An Exploration of the Error Hypothesis},
  author={Marc Willinger and Anthony Ziegelmeyer},
  journal={Experimental Economics},
  year={2001},
  volume={4},
  pages={131-144}
}
We present the results of an experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good with a unique dominant strategy equilibrium in the interior of the strategy space. The treatment variable is the equilibrium contribution level. By increasing the equilibrium contribution level, we reduce the “strength” of the social dilemma. Though we observe that the average level of contribution rises with the equilibrium contribution level, the average rate of over-contribution is not affected in a… CONTINUE READING

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