• Corpus ID: 240419953

Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Facility Location

  title={Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Facility Location},
  author={Haris Aziz and Alexa Lam and Barton E. Lee and Toby Walsh},
  booktitle={Workshop on Internet and Network Economics},
. We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportional fairness. We present several characterization results for mechanisms that satisfy strategyproofness and varying levels of proportional fairness. We also characterize one of the mechanisms as the unique equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies natural fairness and monotonicity properties. Finally, we identify… 

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