Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas

Abstract

We study matching markets in which institutions may have minimum and maximum quotas. Minimum quotas are important in many settings, such as hospital residency matching, military cadet matching, and school choice, but current mechanisms are unable to accommodate them, leading to the use of ad hoc solutions. We introduce two new classes of strategyproof… (More)
DOI: 10.1145/2841226

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Cite this paper

@article{Fragiadakis2015StrategyproofMW, title={Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas}, author={Daniel Fragiadakis and Atsushi Iwasaki and Peter Troyan and Suguru Ueda and Makoto Yokoo}, journal={ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.}, year={2015}, volume={4}, pages={6:1-6:40} }