Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities

  title={Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities},
  author={Jinpeng Ma},
  journal={International Journal of Game Theory},
  • Jinpeng Ma
  • Published 1 March 1994
  • Economics
  • International Journal of Game Theory
We show that, in markets with indivisibilities (typified by the Shapley-Scarf housing market), the strict core mechanism is categorically determined by three assumptions: individual rationality, Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness. 
An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism
Strategy-proofness and Fixed-price Allocation of Indivisible Goods - a Characterization Proof
In this paper we considered the classical Shapley-Scarf (1974) "house allocation model", where in addition there is a perfectly divisible good (money). The problem is to characterize all
Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
Abstract. Strategy-proof allocation of a finite number of indivisible goods among a finite number of individuals is considered. The main result is that in a pure distributional case, a mechanism is
Strategy-Proof and Fair Mechanism in Shapley-Scarf Economies
We study strategy-proof and fair mechanism in Shapley and Scarf (1974) economies. We introduce a new condition for fairness, we call envy-freeness for equal position. It requires that if one agent
Strategy-Proofness and the Core in House Allocation Problems
It is proved that a mechanism (a social choice function) is individually rational, anonymous, strategy-proof, and nonbossy (but not necessarily Pareto efficient) if and only if it is either the core mechanism or the no-trade mechanism.
Strategy‐proofness and Essentially Single‐valued Cores
IN THIS PAPER WE SEARCH for solutions to various classes of allocation problems. We hand results pertaining to housing markets are much more encouraging. Roth 1982b shows that in the context of
Competitive equilibria in Shapley–Scarf markets with couples
Strategy-proof social choice
This paper surveys the literature on strategy-proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on


Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
On cores and indivisibility
Group incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
Some Properties of Weak Domination in an Exchange Market with Indivisible Goods