Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions

  title={Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions},
  author={Mark Satterthwaite},
  journal={Journal of Economic Theory},
Consider a committee which must select one alternative from a set of three or more alternatives. Committee members each cast a ballot which the voting procedure counts. The voting procedure is strategy-proof if it always induces every committee member to cast a ballot revealing his preference. I prove three theorems. First, every strategy-proof voting procedure is dictatorial. Second, this paper’s strategy-proofness condition for voting procedures corresponds to Arrow’s rationality… Expand

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