Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good

  title={Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good},
  author={Kazutoshi Ando and Miki Kato and Shinji Ohseto},
  journal={Mathematical Social Sciences},
We consider economies with a single indivisible good and money.We study the possibility of constructing strategy-proof, symmetric, and budget balanced mechanisms. We show three impossibility results on restricted domains: there is no strategy-proof, symmetric, and budget balancedmechanism satisfying either (i) equal compensation, (ii) normal compensation, or (iii) individual rationality. Moreover, the first result is strengthened by replacing symmetry with weak symmetry. In contrast, we show… CONTINUE READING

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