## References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 45 REFERENCES

### Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points

- Economics
- 1981

Consider allocation mechanisms that are single valued and where each agent's strategy space is a set of a priori admissible utility functions. Such an allocation mechanism is strategy-proof if, for…

### Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited

- EconomicsJ. Econ. Theory
- 2018

### Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms

- EconomicsJ. Econ. Theory
- 2017

### Strategy‐proof size improvement: is it possible?

- EconomicsThe Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- 2022

In unit-demand and multi-copy object allocation problems, we say that a mechanism
size-wise dominates another mechanism if the latter never allocates more objects than the
former does, while the…

### Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange

- Economics
- 2000

We give a characterization of the set of group-strategyproof, Pareto-optimal, and reallocation-proof allocation rules for the assignment problem, where individuals are assigned at most one…

### Incentive Compatible Allocation and Exchange of Discrete Resources

- Economics
- 2015

Allocation and exchange of discrete resources such as kidneys, school seats, and many other resources for which agents have single-unit demand is conducted via direct mechanisms without monetary…

### On Stable and Strategy-Proof Rules in Matching Markets with Contracts

- EconomicsJ. Econ. Theory
- 2017

Stable and (one-sided) strategy-proof rules in many-to-one matching markets with contracts are studied, including cases where a (unique) stable and strategy-Proof rule is not equal to the one induced by the cumulative offer process or the deferred acceptance algorithm.