Strategy-proof allocation with outside option

  title={Strategy-proof allocation with outside option},
  author={Jun Zhang},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  • Jun Zhang
  • Published 11 September 2020
  • Economics
  • Games and Economic Behavior



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