• Corpus ID: 227247779

Strategy-proof Popular Mechanisms.

  title={Strategy-proof Popular Mechanisms.},
  author={Mustafa Oguz Afacan and In'acio B'o},
  journal={arXiv: Theoretical Economics},
We consider the allocation of indivisible objects when agents have preferences over their own allocations, but share the ownership of the resources to be distributed. Examples might include seats in public schools, faculty offices, and time slots in public tennis courts. Given an allocation, groups of agents who would prefer an alternative allocation might challenge it. An assignment is popular if it is not challenged by another one. By assuming that agents' ability to challenge allocations can… 


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