Strategy-proof Location on a Network

  title={Strategy-proof Location on a Network},
  author={James Schummer and Rakesh V. Vohra},
  journal={J. Economic Theory},
We consider rules that choose a location on a graph (e.g. a road network) based on agents’ single-peaked preferences. First, we characterize the class of strategy-proof, onto rules when the graph is a tree. Such a rule is based on a collection of generalized median voter rules (Moulin, 1980) satisfying a consistency condition. Second, we characterize such rules for graphs containing cycles. We show that while such a rule is not necessarily dictatorial, the existence of a cycle grants some agent… CONTINUE READING
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