Corpus ID: 16633856

Strategy and Manipulation in Medieval Elections

  title={Strategy and Manipulation in Medieval Elections},
  author={Sara L. Uckelman and Joel Uckelman},
There are many goals in developing electoral protocols, including a desire for a system which is transparent, in that it is clear what the rule or procedure to follow is; nonmanipulable, in that it is not in a person’s best interest to misrepresent their preferences; honest, in the sense that it elects the ‘right’ candidate; and not open to strategizing, i.e., bribery or collusion. However, these desiderata are in tension with each other: Often, transparent electoral procedures are the least… Expand
Ramon Llull: from ‘Ars electionis’ to social choice theory
  • J. Colomer
  • Sociology, Computer Science
  • Soc. Choice Welf.
  • 2013
The present article places Llull’s contributions and discussion in the historical context of elections in the medieval Church and the emergence of majority rule as a new general principle for making enforceable collective decisions in replacement of traditional unanimous requirements. Expand
Handbook of Computational Social Choice
This handbook, written by thirty-six prominent members of the computational social choice community, covers the field comprehensively and offers detailed introductions to each of the field's major themes. Expand


Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
It has been conjectured that no system of voting can preclude strategic voting-the securing by a voter of an outcome he prefers through misrepresentation of his preferences. In this paper, for allExpand
Vote manipulation in the presence of multiple sincere ballots
This paper explores to what extent the presence of multiple sincere ballots allows the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem to be circumvented, and shows that there are several interesting settings in which no voter will have an incentive not to vote by means of some sincere ballot. Expand
Voting in the Medieval Papacy and Religious Orders
We take institutions seriously as both a rational response to dilemmas in which agents found themselves and a frame to which later rational agents adapted their behaviour in turn. Medieval corporateExpand
Electing the Doge of Venice: Analysis of a 13th Century Protocol
The protocol used for electing the Doge of Venice between 1268 and the end of the Republic in 1797 is discussed, it is shown that it has some useful properties, and its fundamental design principle is suggested to be worth investigating for application to leader election protocols in computer science. Expand
64% Majority rule in Ducal Venice: Voting for the Doge
A recent result of Caplin and Nalebuff (1988) demonstrates that, under certain conditions on individual preferences and their distribution across society, super-majority rule performs well as aExpand
Vote Buying
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties competing in a binary election may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game viaExpand
The borda and condorcet principles: Three medieval applications
We report three medieval works, hitherto unknown to social choice, which discuss procedures for elections when there are more than two candidates. Two of the three propose Borda methods and the thirdExpand
Approval voting and strategy analysis: A Venetian example
The author presents a historic reconstruction of the single-member constituency election system known as approval voting which was used to elect Venetian dogi for over 500 years. An interestingExpand
The principles of representative government
The thesis of this original and provocative book is that representative government should be understood as a combination of democratic and undemocratic, aristocratic elements. Professor ManinExpand
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
Consider a committee which must select one alternative from a set of three or more alternatives. Committee members each cast a ballot which the voting procedure counts. The voting procedure isExpand