Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property

@inproceedings{Weymark2008StrategyProofnessAT,
  title={Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property},
  author={John A. Weymark},
  year={2008}
}
A social choice function satisfies the tops-only property if the chosen alternative only depends on each person’s report of his most-preferred alternatives on the range of this function. On many domains, strategyproofness implies the tops-only property, provided that the range of the social choice function satisfies some regularity condition. The existing proofs of this result are model specific. In this article, a general proof strategy is proposed for showing that a strategy-proof social… CONTINUE READING
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