Strategy-Proofness and Arrow’s Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions*

@inproceedings{Satterthwaite2003StrategyProofnessAA,
  title={Strategy-Proofness and Arrow’s Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions*},
  author={Mark Satterthwaite and J L Blin and Richard F. Day and Theodore Groves and Rubin Saposnik and Maria Schmundt and Hugo F. Sonnenschein},
  year={2003}
}
Consider a committee which must select one alternative from a set of three or more alternatives. Committee members each cast a ballot which the voting procedure counts. The voting procedure is strategy-proof if it always induces every committee member to cast a ballot revealing his preference. I prove three theorems. First, every strategy-proof voting procedure is dictatorial. Second, this paper’s strategy-proofness condition for voting procedures corresponds to Arrow’s rationality… CONTINUE READING
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