Strategy Choice in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma

  title={Strategy Choice in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma},
  author={Pedro Dal B{\'o} and Guillaume Fr{\'e}chette},
  journal={American Economic Review},
We use a novel experimental design to reliably elicit subjects’ strategies in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma experiment with perfect monitoring. We find that three simple strategies repre‑ sent the majority of the chosen strategies: Always Defect, Tit‑for‑Tat, and Grim. In addition, we identify how the strategies systematically vary with the parameters of the game. Finally, we use the elicited strategies to test the ability to recover strategies using statistical methods based on… 
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  • J. Bland
  • Economics
    Journal of the Economic Science Association
  • 2020
Out of 60 ex ante plausible specifications, the selected model uses the six strategies described in Dal Bo and Frechette (2018), and allows the distribution of trembles to vary by strategy.
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