Strategies for revising judgment: how (and how well) people use others' opinions.

  title={Strategies for revising judgment: how (and how well) people use others' opinions.},
  author={Jack B. Soll and Richard P. Larrick},
  journal={Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and cognition},
  volume={35 3},
  • Jack B. Soll, R. Larrick
  • Published 1 May 2009
  • Psychology, Medicine
  • Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and cognition
A basic issue in social influence is how best to change one's judgment in response to learning the opinions of others. This article examines the strategies that people use to revise their quantitative estimates on the basis of the estimates of another person. The authors note that people tend to use 2 basic strategies when revising estimates: choosing between the 2 estimates and averaging them. The authors developed the probability, accuracy, redundancy (PAR) model to examine the relative… 

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