Strategic investment in protection in networked systems

  title={Strategic investment in protection in networked systems},
  author={Matt V. Leduc and Ruslan Momot},
  journal={Network Science},
  pages={108 - 139}
Abstract We study the incentives that agents have to invest in costly protection against cascading failures in networked systems. Applications include vaccination, computer security, and airport security. Agents are connected through a network and can fail either intrinsically or as a result of the failure of a subset of their neighbors. We characterize the equilibrium based on an agent's failure probability and derive conditions under which equilibrium strategies are monotone in degree (i.e… 
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