Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue: experimental evidence

@article{Breinbjerg2016StrategicBA,
  title={Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue: experimental evidence},
  author={Jesper Breinbjerg and Alexander Sebald and Lars Peter {\O}sterdal},
  journal={Review of Economic Design},
  year={2016},
  volume={20},
  pages={207-236}
}
We theoretically and experimentally study the differential incentive effects of three well known queue disciplines in a strategic environment in which a bottleneck facility opens and impatient players decide when to arrive. For a class of three-player games, we derive equilibrium arrivals under the first-in-first-out (FIFO), last-in-first-out (LIFO), and service-in-random-order (SIRO) queue disciplines and compare these predictions to outcomes from a laboratory experiment. In line with our… CONTINUE READING

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