Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals

  title={Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals},
  author={Philip Bond and H{\"u}lya Eraslan},
Prior research on “strategic voting” has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad: it results in destruction of information, and hence makes voters worse off. We show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous, i.e., independent of the voting rule used. We depart from the existing literature by endogenizing the proposal that is put to a vote, and establish that under many circumstances unanimity rule makes voters better… CONTINUE READING

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