Strategic Timing in Group Negotiations : The Implications of Forced Entry and Forced Exit for Negotiators with Unequal Power

@inproceedings{Kim1997StrategicTI,
  title={Strategic Timing in Group Negotiations : The Implications of Forced Entry and Forced Exit for Negotiators with Unequal Power},
  author={Peter H. Kim},
  year={1997}
}
This study used a three-person mixed-motive negotiation to (1) investigate the effects of asymmetrical caucusing (i.e., negotiations in which parties possess unequal opportunities to engage in discussion) on group negotiations and (2) assess potential explanations for these effects. Negotiators who were excluded from part of the discussion received a smaller share of rewards than those who remained throughout the discussion, and those who were excluded from the latter half of the discussion… CONTINUE READING