Strategic Opposition and Government Cohesion in Westminster Democracies

@article{Dewan2011StrategicOA,
  title={Strategic Opposition and Government Cohesion in Westminster Democracies},
  author={Torun Dewan and Arthur Spirling},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  year={2011},
  volume={105},
  pages={337 - 358}
}
Cohesive government-versus-opposition voting is a robust empirical regularity in Westminster democracies. Using new data from the modern Scottish Parliament, we show that this pattern cannot be explained by similarity of preferences within or between the government and opposition ranks. We look at differences in the way that parties operate in Westminster and Holyrood, and use roll call records to show that the observed behavior is unlikely to be determined by preferences on any underlying… 

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