Strategic Militarization, Deterrence and Wars

@article{Jackson2008StrategicMD,
  title={Strategic Militarization, Deterrence and Wars},
  author={Matthew O. Jackson and Massimo Morelli},
  journal={Conflict Studies eJournal},
  year={2008}
}
We study countries choosing armament levels and then whether or not to go to war. We show that if the costs of war are not overly high or low, then all equilibria must involve dove, hawk, and deterrent strategies and the probability of war is positive (but less than one) in any given period. Wars are between countries with differing armament levels and the frequency of wars is tempered by the presence of armament levels that are expressly chosen for their deterrent properties. As the… 

Figures from this paper

Containing Rogues: A Theory of Asymmetric Arming
  • A. Coe
  • Political Science, Economics
    The Journal of Politics
  • 2018
Weak opponents of a strong state often cannot compete directly with its power and so resort to other means of shifting the balance of power, such as developing weapons of mass destruction, sponsoring
Soldiers or politicians? Institutions, conflict, and the military’s role in politics
  • G. Leon
  • Political Science, Economics
  • 2014
One of the most striking institutional differences across countries is the extent to which their militaries intervene in politics. This article examines the role of war in generating these
A Theory of Power Wars
This paper provides a theory of how war onset and war duration depend on the initial distribution of power when conflict triggers a reallocation of power but the loser is not eliminated. In the
Self-Containment
In anarchic settings, potential rivals can be dragged into arms races degenerating in open wars out of mutual suspicion. We propose a novel commitment device for contestants to avoid both arming and
A Bargain Might Not Exist : How the Distribution of Power Causes War
This paper challenges the conventional wisdom about bargaining and war. If more than two players bargain, or if war can end in stalemate, then a bargain that all actors prefer to war may not
Bargaining and war: A review of some formal models
Would perfectly rational agents always negotiate peaceful outcomes at the bargaining table, or would they sometimes fight costly wars? The Coase theorem suggests that when rational agents negotiate
Conflict and Deterrence Under Strategic Risk
We examine the determinants of cooperation and the effectiveness of deterrence when fear is a motive for conflict.We contrast results obtained in a complete information setting with those obtained in
More dangerous than dyads : bargaining and war in multi-actor disputes
For the bargaining model of war, in the absence of incomplete information and commitment problems, war is irrational. But this finding rests on a simple and rarely discussed assumption, that
Essays on political economy
This collection of essays investigates issues related to elections and wars. In the first essay, we present an auction-type model of war and characterize its unique equilibrium. We offer three
Self-Containment : Achieving Peace in Anarchic Settings CRED WP 2010 / 14
In anarchic settings, the potential rivals are dragged in an arms race that can degenerate in an open war out of mutual suspicion. We propose a novel commitment device for contestants to avoid both
...
...

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 87 REFERENCES
Military Coercion in Interstate Crises
Military mobilization simultaneously sinks costs, because it must be paid for regardless of the outcome, and ties hands, because it increases the probability of winning should war occur. Existing
The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States
Because war is costly and risky, states have incentives to negotiate and avoid conflict. The common rationalist explanation is that war results from private information and incentives to misrepresent
Strategic Uncertainty as a Cause of War
This paper shows why states, acting in their own self-interest, may create informational asymmetries that lead to war. In our models, two actors with no private information invest in military
Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information
Conflict and war are typically viewed as the outcome of misperceptions, incomplete information, or even irrationality. The authors show that it can be otherwise. Despite the short-run incentives to
Political Bias and War
We examine how countries' incentives to go to war depend on the "political bias" of their pivotal decision makers. This bias is measured by a decision maker’s risk/ reward ratio from a war compared
Fighting Battles, Winning Wars
The author models warfare as a random-walk stochastic process. Rather than model war as a single-shot lottery, as is common in the literature, nations fight a series of battles. Nations do not defeat
Conflict and Deterrence Under Strategic Risk
We examine the determinants of cooperation and the effectiveness of deterrence when fear is a motive for conflict.We contrast results obtained in a complete information setting with those obtained in
Guns, Butter, and Anarchy
A state in the international system implicit in realism must allocate its limited resources between satisfying its intrinsically valued ends and the means of military power. I formalize this
Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War.
Democracies are less likely to fight wars with each other. They are also more likely to prevail in wars with autocratic states. I offer an explanation of this syndrome of powerful pacifism drawn from
Game Theory and the Spiral Model
When one state engages in a military buildup, other states sometimes take this as a sign that it is more aggressive or expansionist than they previously thought. Some argue that such increases in
...
...