Strategic Logic of Elite Purges in Dictatorships

  title={Strategic Logic of Elite Purges in Dictatorships},
  author={Jun Koga Sudduth},
  journal={Comparative Political Studies},
  pages={1768 - 1801}
  • J. Sudduth
  • Published 2 February 2017
  • Political Science
  • Comparative Political Studies
Why do some leaders eliminate rivals from authoritarian regimes and therefore diminish elites’ capabilities to remove them via coup, while others do not? By examining both dictators’ incentives and opportunities to weaken regime elites, I show that dictators are more likely to eliminate rivals when elites’ capabilities to oust dictators are temporarily low. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, my theory predicts that dictators are more likely to weaken elites’ capabilities as the threat of coup… 

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