Strategic Ignorance in Bargaining

@inproceedings{Conrads2011StrategicII,
  title={Strategic Ignorance in Bargaining},
  author={Julian Conrads and Bernd Irlenbusch},
  year={2011}
}
Strategic Ignorance in Bargaining In his classic article “An Essay on Bargaining” Schelling (1956) argues that ignorance might actually be strength rather than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling’s conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave bargaining experiment where the proposer can choose between two possible offers. Option A always gives the proposer a higher payoff than option B. The payoff of the responder depends on the (randomly determined) state of nature, i.e., in state s2 payoffs of… CONTINUE READING

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