Strategic Distinguishability with an application to Robust Virtual Implementation

@inproceedings{Bergemann2007StrategicDW,
  title={Strategic Distinguishability with an application to Robust Virtual Implementation},
  author={Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris},
  year={2007}
}
In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payo¤ types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs and higher order beliefs. We show that two types are strategically distinguishable if and only if they satisfy a separability condition. The separability condition for each agent essentially requires that there is not too much interdependence in preferences across agents. A social choice function… CONTINUE READING

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