Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures

  title={Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures},
  author={Bhaskar Dutta and Matthew O. Jackson and Michel Le Breton},
We study the impact of considering the incentives of candidates to strategically a ect the outcome of a voting procedure. First we show that every non-dictatorial voting procedure that satis es unanimity, is open to strategic entry or exit by candidates: there necessarily exists some candidate who can a ect the outcome by entering or exiting the election, even when she does not win the election. Given that strategic candidacy always matters, we analyze the impact of strategic candidacy e ects… CONTINUE READING
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