Stochasticity in economic losses increases the value of reputation in indirect reciprocity

  title={Stochasticity in economic losses increases the value of reputation in indirect reciprocity},
  author={Miguel dos Santos and Sarah Plac{\`i} and Claus Wedekind},
  journal={Scientific Reports},
Recent theory predicts harsh and stochastic conditions to generally promote the evolution of cooperation. Here, we test experimentally whether stochasticity in economic losses also affects the value of reputation in indirect reciprocity, a type of cooperation that is very typical for humans. We used a repeated helping game with observers. One subject (the “Unlucky”) lost some money, another one (the “Passer-by”) could reduce this loss by accepting a cost to herself, thereby building up a… 



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