• Corpus ID: 221970821

Stochastic stability of a recency weighted sampling dynamic

  title={Stochastic stability of a recency weighted sampling dynamic},
  author={Alexander Aurell and Gustav Karreskog},
  journal={arXiv: Theoretical Economics},
It is common to model learning in games so that either a deterministic process or a finite state Markov chain describes the evolution of play. Such processes can however produce undesired outputs, where the players' behavior is heavily influenced by the modeling. In simulations we see how the assumptions in (Young, 1993), a well-studied model for stochastic stability, lead to unexpected behavior in games without strict equilibria, such as Matching Pennies. The behavior should be considered a… 

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