Stochastic coalitional better-response dynamics and stable equilibrium

  title={Stochastic coalitional better-response dynamics and stable equilibrium},
  author={Konstantin E. Avrachenkov and Vikas Vikram Singh},
  journal={Automation and Remote Control},
We consider coalition formation among players in an n-player finite strategic game over infinite horizon. At each time a randomly formed coalition makes a joint deviation from a current action profile such that at new action profile all the players from the coalition are strictly benefited. Such deviations define a coalitional better-response (CBR) dynamics that is in general stochastic. The CBR dynamics either converges to a K-stable equilibrium or becomes stuck in a closed cycle. We also… 

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