• Corpus ID: 246411520

Stochastic Consensus and the Shadow of Doubt

  title={Stochastic Consensus and the Shadow of Doubt},
  author={Emilien Macault},
We propose a stochastic model of opinion exchange in networks. Consider a nite set of agents organized in a xed network structure. There is a binary state of the world and, ex ante, each agent is informed either about the true state of the world with probability α or about the wrong state with probability 1 − α . We model beliefs as urns where white balls represent the true state and black balls the wrong state. Communication happens in discrete time and, at each period, agents draw and display… 



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