Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics

  title={Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics},
  author={David Benatar},
  journal={The Journal of Ethics},
  • D. Benatar
  • Published 1 June 2013
  • Philosophy
  • The Journal of Ethics
In Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence, I argued that coming into existence is always a harm and that procreation is wrong. In this paper, I respond to those of my critics to whom I have not previously responded. More specifically, I engage the objections of Tim Bayne, Ben Bradley, Campbell Brown, David DeGrazia, Elizabeth Harman, Chris Kaposy, Joseph Packer and Saul Smilansky. 
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  • D. Degrazia
  • Philosophy
    Theoretical medicine and bioethics
  • 2010
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