Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns

  title={Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns},
  author={Lex Donaldson and James Herbert Davis},
  journal={Australian Journal of Management},
  pages={49 - 64}
Agency theory argues that shareholder interests require protection by separation of incumbency of rôles of board chair and CEO. Stewardship theory argues shareholder interests are maximised by shared incumbency of these rôles. Results of an empirical test fail to support agency theory and provide some support for stewardship theory. 

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