Status Quo Bias, Rationality, and Conservatism about Value*

@article{Nebel2015StatusQB,
  title={Status Quo Bias, Rationality, and Conservatism about Value*},
  author={Jacob M. Nebel},
  journal={Ethics},
  year={2015},
  volume={125},
  pages={449 - 476}
}
Many economists and philosophers assume that status quo bias is necessarily irrational. I argue that, in some cases, status quo bias is fully rational. I discuss the rationality of status quo bias on both subjective and objective theories of the rationality of preferences. I argue that subjective theories cannot plausibly condemn this bias as irrational. I then discuss one kind of objective theory, which holds that a conservative bias toward existing things of value is rational. This account… 
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