Statistical criteria for establishing a truly false consensus effect

  title={Statistical criteria for establishing a truly false consensus effect},
  author={Robyn M. Dawes},
  journal={Journal of Experimental Social Psychology},
  • R. Dawes
  • Published 1989
  • Psychology
  • Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
A methodological note about the measurement of the false‐consensus effect
Although the existence of the false consensus effect is beyond all doubt, its interpretation as a judgemental bias is still a matter of debate. Krueger recently proposed a new measure for this
The Truly False Consensus Effect: An Ineradicable and Egocentric Bias in Social Perception
Consensus bias is the overuse of self-related knowledge in estimating the prevalence of attributes in a population. The bias seems statistically appropriate (Dawes, 1989), but according to the
Differential construal and the false consensus effect.
  • T. Gilovich
  • Psychology
    Journal of personality and social psychology
  • 1990
The present research examined whether this "false consensus effect" is partly due to people's failure to recognize that their choices are not solely a function of the "objective" response alternatives, but of their subjective construal of those alternatives.
The primacy of self-referent information in perceptions of social consensus.
Supporting the projection model, it is shown that self-referent information is more accessible than consensus estimates and that, when making consensus estimates, people rely more on their own endorsements than on the endorsements made by another individual.
A short note on the rationality of the false consensus effect
In experiments which measure subjects’ beliefs, both beliefs about others’ behavior and beliefs about others’ beliefs, are often correlated with a subject’s own choices. Such phenomena have been
False Consensus Effect
The false consensus effect refers to the tendency to overestimate the extent to which one's opinions are also shared by others. It was first formally addressed in an influential article by Ross,
Accuracy and bias in estimates of others' knowledge
Perspective-taking is central to much social interaction, but the processes by which it is accomplished are poorly understood. The current study examines accuracy and bias in one type of
"Social categorization and the truly false consensus effect": Correction to Krueger and Zeiger.
The false consensus effect involves adequate inductive reasoning and egocentric biases. To detect truly false consensus effects (TFCEs), we correlated item endorsements with the differences between
The “Golden Section” and Bias in Perceptions of Social Consensus
  • S. Gross, N. Miller
  • Economics
    Personality and social psychology review : an official journal of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc
  • 1997
Meta-analytic examination of 128 false consensus effect issues supports the hypothesis that the “Golden Section” (61.8% group size) approximates the level of actual consensus that separates overestimation of consensus from underestimation, and the Golden Section holds for majorities and minorities defined by agreement with an issue.
Like goes with like: The role of representativeness in erroneous and pseudo-scientific beliefs.
As its name implies, the heuristics and biases approach to human judgment has both positive and negative agendas (Griffin, Gonzalez, & Varey, 2001). The positive agenda is to identify the mental


Mechanisms Underlying the False Consensus Effect
The current studies investigated the role of self-serving motivations in the False Consensus Effect (FCE). There were two major goals. First, the studies tested whether consensus estimates would be
Accuracy in perceptions of consensus: Differential tendencies of people with majority and minority positions.
When people are interested in how common one or more of their attributes is in a reference population, they must often generate their own comparison information based on a limited sample of
Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution
Five experiments were conducted to assess biases in availability of information in memory and attributions of responsibilit y for the actions and decisions that occurred during a previous group
An Experimental Analysis of the Contrast Effect and Its Implications for Intergroup Communication and the Indirect Assessment of Attitude.
Experiments I and II were designed to differentiate between alternative interpretations of the contrast effect. Experiment I examines and rejects the hypothesis that the effect is specific to rating
When Do Base Rates Affect Predictions
Recent studies have shown that when people make predictions, they often neglect base-rate considerations. Instead of considering what typically happens in situations like the one being judged, they
Ten years of research on the false-consensus effect: an empirical and theoretical review
Ten years of research on the false-consensus effect (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977) and related biases in social perception (e.g., assumed similarity and overestimation of consensus) are examined in
Interpreting regression toward the mean in developmental research.
The fundamental nature of regression toward the mean is frequently misunderstood by developmental researchers. While errors of measurement are commonly assumed to be the sole source of regression