Corpus ID: 235364020

Stateful Strategic Regression

  title={Stateful Strategic Regression},
  author={Keegan Harris and Hoda Heidari and Zhiwei Steven Wu},
Automated decision-making tools increasingly assess individuals to determine if they qualify for high-stakes opportunities. A recent line of research investigates how strategic agents may respond to such scoring tools to receive favorable assessments. While prior work has focused on the short-term strategic interactions between a decision-making institution (modeled as a principal) and individual decision-subjects (modeled as agents), we investigate interactions spanning multiple time-steps. In… Expand

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