State-owned enterprises as indirect instruments of entry regulation

@article{Brando2007StateownedEA,
  title={State-owned enterprises as indirect instruments of entry regulation},
  author={A. Brand{\~a}o and S. Castro},
  journal={Journal of Economics},
  year={2007},
  volume={92},
  pages={263-274}
}
In the context of mixed markets, Matsumura and Kanda (J Econ 84(1): 27–48, 2005) show that social welfare in free entry equilibrium is maximized when there exists a public firm in the market. En passant, these authors state that this outcome is connected to the entry-deterring influence of a public firm. In this way, they counter-act the excess entry problem of Mankiw and Whinston (Rand J Econ 17(1): 48–58, 1986). We explain this result arguing that the state-owned firm can be an indirect… Expand
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