Standing Apart and Sitting Together. Enforcing Coalition Agreements in Multiparty Systems

  title={Standing Apart and Sitting Together. Enforcing Coalition Agreements in Multiparty Systems},
  author={Arco Timmermans},
  journal={European Journal of Political Research},
  • A. Timmermans
  • Published 1 March 2006
  • Political Science
  • European Journal of Political Research
One of the most obvious questions to be asked about coalition governments is what these governments do, but this question has received little systematic attention from coalition researchers. A key element of coalition governance that may inform our empirical knowledge of the actions of government – their origin, organization and results – is coalition agreements. Party leaders negotiating a new government invest time in writing coalition agreements, and they do this because they expect… 

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