Standard state-space models preclude unawareness

@article{Dekel1998StandardSM,
  title={Standard state-space models preclude unawareness},
  author={Eddie Dekel and Barton L. Lipman and Aldo Rustichini},
  journal={Econometrica},
  year={1998},
  volume={66},
  pages={159-173}
}
We show that a very broad class of models, including possibility correspondences, necessarily fail to capture very simple and intuitive implications of unawareness. We explain why standard state–space formulations suffer from this problem, illustrating the point with an example of a nonstandard state–space model which avoids the difficulty. 

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