Stance, feeling and phenomenology

  title={Stance, feeling and phenomenology},
  author={M. Ratcliffe},
  • M. Ratcliffe
  • Published 2009
  • Philosophy, Computer Science
  • Synthese
  • This paper addresses Bas van Fraassen’s claim that empiricism is a ‘stance’. I begin by distinguishing two different kinds of stance: an explicit epistemic policy and an implicit way of ‘finding oneself in a world’. At least some of van Fraassen’s claims, I suggest, refer to the latter. In explicating his ordinarily implicit ‘empirical stance’, he assumes the stance of the phenomenologist, describing the structure of his commitment to empiricism without committing to it in the process. This… CONTINUE READING
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