Stalloris: RPKI Downgrade Attack

@inproceedings{Hlavacek2022StallorisRD,
  title={Stalloris: RPKI Downgrade Attack},
  author={Tom Hlavacek and Philipp Jeitner and Donika Mirdita and Haya Shulman and Michael Waidner},
  booktitle={USENIX Security Symposium},
  year={2022}
}
We demonstrate the first downgrade attacks against RPKI. The key design property in RPKI that allows our attacks is the tradeoff between connectivity and security: when networks cannot retrieve RPKI information from publication points, they make routing decisions in BGP without validating RPKI. We exploit this tradeoff to develop attacks that prevent the retrieval of the RPKI objects from the public repositories, thereby disabling RPKI validation and exposing the RPKI-protected networks to prefix… 

Poster: RPKI Kill Switch

This work performs a black-box analysis of the patched relying party implementations and finds that out of five popular relying parties, two major implementations (Routinator and OctoRPKI) have vulnerabilities that can be exploited to cause large scale blackouts in the RPKI ecosystem.

Behind the Scenes of RPKI

This work finds that the resilience of RPKI can be subverted through DNS, and demonstrates, that resilience of systems, like RPKI, cannot be achieved in isolation due to complex inter-dependencies with other systems.

SERVFAIL: The Unintended Consequences of Algorithm Agility in DNSSEC

This work shows for the first time that the cryptographic agility in DNSSEC, although critical for making DNS secure with strong cryptography, also introduces a severe vulnerability.

The Juice Is Worth the Squeeze: Analysis of Autonomous System Provider Authorization in Partial Deployment

Light is shed on the effectiveness of ASPAs in a partial deployment alongside the conventional BGP through experiments based on a real AS topology, and promising results show that the adversary will no longer obtain an advantage even by leveraging ASPAs.

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 31 REFERENCES

On the risk of misbehaving RPKI authorities

It is shown how design decisions that elegantly address the vulnerabilities in the original threat model have unexpected side effects in this flipped threat model, and implications on the design of security architectures that are appropriate for the untrusted and error-prone Internet are suggested.

Are We There Yet? On RPKI's Deployment and Security

It is shown that without almost ubiquitous ROV adoption by large ISPs significant security benefits cannot be attained, and potential reasons for scarce adoption of RPKI and ROV are examined, including human error in issuing RPKI certificates and inter-organization dependencies.

DISCO: Sidestepping RPKI's Deployment Barriers

It is shown that settling for de facto ownership is sufficient for protecting against hazardous prefix hijacking and can be accomplished without requiring any changes to today’s routing infrastructure.

Fragmentation Considered Vulnerable

It is shown that fragmented IPv4 and IPv6 traffic is vulnerable to effective interception and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks by an off-path attacker, and practical defenses for the attacks can be deployed on network firewalls without changes to hosts or operating system kernel.

DNS Cache Poisoning Attack Reloaded: Revolutions with Side Channels

In this paper, we report a series of flaws in the software stack that leads to a strong revival of DNS cache poisoning --- a classic attack which is mitigated in practice with simple and effective

DNS Cache Poisoning Attack: Resurrections with Side Channels

An analysis of the previously overlooked attack surface is conducted, and even stronger side channels that have existed for over a decade in Linux kernels are uncovered, including BIND, Unbound and dnsmasq.

To Filter or Not to Filter: Measuring the Benefits of Registering in the RPKI Today

It is found that an increasing number of transit and access providers indeed do enforce RPKI filtering, which translates to a direct benefit for the networks using the RPKI in the case of illicit announcements of their address space.

Bamboozling Certificate Authorities with BGP

This paper performs the first real-world demonstration of BGP attacks to obtain bogus certificates from top CAs in an ethical manner and proposes and evaluates two countermeasures to secure the PKI: CAs verifying domains from multiple vantage points to make it harder to launch a successful attack.

Slow DoS attacks: definition and categorisation

This paper studies slow DoS attacks, analysing in detail the current threats and presenting a proper definition and categorisation for such attacks, to provide a useful framework for the study of this field, for the analysis of network vulnerabilities, and for the proposal of innovative intrusion detection methodologies.

Domain Validation++ For MitM-Resilient PKI

The proposed Domain Validation++ (DV++) replaces the need in cryptography through assumptions in distributed systems and is secure even against Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attackers.