Stable partitions in coalitional games

@article{Apt2006StablePI,
  title={Stable partitions in coalitional games},
  author={Krzysztof R. Apt and Tadeusz Radzik},
  journal={CoRR},
  year={2006},
  volume={abs/cs/0605132}
}
We propose a notion of a stable partition in a coalitional game that is parametrized by the concept of a defection function. This function assigns to each partition of the grand coalition a set of different coalition arrangements for a group of defecting players. The alternatives are compared using their social welfare. We characterize the stability of a partition for a number of most natural defection functions and investigate whether and how so defined stable partitions can be reached from… CONTINUE READING
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