• Corpus ID: 239049390

Stable marriage in the eyes of the law

  title={Stable marriage in the eyes of the law},
  author={Mikhail Freer and Khushboo Surana},
We present a framework to study household consumption under the assumption of marital stability in the presence of divorce legislation. Using this model, we derive nonparametric conditions that allow us to identify the intrahousehold consumption allocation. We study two integral dimensions of divorce legislation. First, we consider a regime governing divorce itself. The legislation either allows partners to divorce unilaterally at will or requires the mutual consent of both partners to dissolve… 


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