• Corpus ID: 244169089

Stable Outcomes and Information in Games: An Empirical Framework

  title={Stable Outcomes and Information in Games: An Empirical Framework},
  author={Paul S. Koh},
Empirically, many strategic settings are characterized by stable outcomes in which players’ decisions are publicly observed, yet no player takes the opportunity to deviate. To analyze such situations in the presence of incomplete information, we build an empirical framework by introducing a novel solution concept that we call Bayes stable equilibrium. Our framework allows the researcher to be agnostic about players’ information and the equilibrium selection rule. The Bayes stable equilibrium… 

Figures and Tables from this paper

Estimating Dynamic Games with Unknown Information Structure
This paper studies identification and estimation of dynamic games when the underlying information structure is unknown to the researcher. To tractably characterize the set of model predictions while
Estimating Discrete Games of Complete Information: Bringing Logit Back in the Game
This paper considers the estimation of static discrete games of complete information under pure strategy Nash equilibrium and no assumptions on the equilibrium selection rule, which is often viewed


The Identification Power of Equilibrium in Simple Games
We examine the identification power that (Nash) equilibrium assumptions play in conducting inference about parameters in some simple games. We focus on three static games in which we drop the Nash
Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information
We analyze games of incomplete information and offer equilibrium predictions which are valid for, and in this sense robust to, all possible private information structures that the agents may have.
Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games
A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game and an information structure. The basic game defines the set of actions, the set of payoff states the payoff functions and the
Identification and Estimation of Dynamic Games When Players' Beliefs are Not in Equilibrium
This paper deals with the identification and estimation of dynamic games when players' beliefs about other players' actions are biased, i.e., beliefs do not represent the probability distribution of
Estimation of discrete games with weak assumptions on information
A method to estimate static discrete games with weak assumptions on the information available to players, and characterize the sharp identified set under the assumption of BCE and no assumptions on equilibrium selection, and finds that in simple games with modest variation in observable covariates identi fled sets are narrow enough to be informative.
Identification and inference in discrete choice models with imperfect information
The methodology and data on the 2017 UK general election are used to estimate a spatial model of voting under weak assumptions on the information that voters have about the returns to voting and it is found that the assumptions in the information environment can drive the interpretation of voter preferences.
Inference on Auctions with Weak Assumptions on Information
This paper examines the question of inference on auction fundamentals under weak assumptions on information structure, and proposes novel finite sample methods using tail inequalities that are used to construct confidence regions on sets and methods based on Bayesian bootstrap and subsampling.
Market Structure and Multiple Equilibria in Airline Markets
We provide a framework for inference in discrete games that involve multiple decision makers and use it to study airline market structure in the US. We make inferences on a "class of models" rather
Set Identification in Models with Multiple Equilibria
We propose a computationally feasible way of deriving the identified features of models with multiple equilibria in pure or mixed strategies. It is shown that in the case of Shapley regular normal
Information at equilibrium
Summary. In a game with rational expectations, individuals simultaneously refine their information with the information revealed by the strategies of other individuals. At a Nash equilibrium of a