Stable Matching with Incomplete Information ∗ , †

  title={Stable Matching with Incomplete Information ∗ , †},
  author={Qingmin Liu and George J. Mailath},
We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual problem is to formulate a notion of a blocking pair that takes account of the inferences that the uninformed agent might make from the hypothesis that the current allocation is stable. We show that the set of stable outcomes is nonempty in incomplete information environments, and is a superset of the set of complete-information stable outcomes. We then provide sufficient… CONTINUE READING
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