Stable Fractional Matchings

@article{Caragiannis2019StableFM,
  title={Stable Fractional Matchings},
  author={Ioannis Caragiannis and Aris Filos-Ratsikas and Panagiotis Kanellopoulos and Rohit Vaish},
  journal={Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation},
  year={2019}
}
We study a generalization of the classical stable matching problem that allows for cardinal preferences (as opposed to ordinal) and fractional matchings (as opposed to integral). After observing that, in this cardinal setting, stable fractional matchings can have much higher social welfare than stable integral ones, our goal is to understand the computational complexity of finding an optimal (i.e., welfare-maximizing) or nearly-optimal stable fractional matching. We present simple approximation… 

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