• Corpus ID: 14541846

Stability scores: measuring coalitional stability

  title={Stability scores: measuring coalitional stability},
  author={Michal Feldman and R. Meir and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  booktitle={Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agent Systems},
We introduce a measure for the level of stability against coalitional deviations, called stability scores, which generalizes widely used notions of stability in non-cooperative games. We use the proposed measure to compare various Nash equilibria in congestion games, and to quantify the effect of game parameters on coalitional stability. For our main results, we apply stability scores to analyze and compare the Generalized Second Price (GSP) and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) ad auctions. We show… 

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