Stability of Mixed Equilibria ∗

@inproceedings{Gorodeisky2005StabilityOM,
  title={Stability of Mixed Equilibria ∗},
  author={Ziv Gorodeisky},
  year={2005}
}
We consider stability properties of equilibria in stochastic evolutionary dynamics. In particular, we study the stability of mixed equilibria in strategic form games. In these games, when the populations are small, all strategies may be stable. We prove that when the populations are large, the unique stable outcome of best-reply dynamics in 2 × 2 games with a unique Nash equilibrium that is completely mixed is the mixed equilibrium. The proof of this result is based on estimating transition… CONTINUE READING

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